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ZERO RATING AS THE
DEMON AND THE
SAVIOUR: RETHINKING
NET NEUTRALITY AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Smarika Kumar*

Abstract Zero-rated mobile applications like Internet.
org have been characterised both as a supposed exterminator of
the digital divide and as a violation of net neutrality in developing
countries like India. This serves to illustrate how net neutrality and
bridging digital divide have been posited as goals in contradiction
to each other. How this seeming contradiction is relevant to
developing a more nuanced understanding of the freedom of
speech and expression and of net neutrality is the subject of the
present paper. Accordingly, the paper is divided into three broad
sections: I begin by analysing how far different conceptions of
freedom of speech and expression respond to private forms of
clamping of speech. To do this, I invoke Jack Balkin’s theory of
democratic culture and contextualise it against the jurisprudence
on freedom of expression in contexts of private discrimination
in India. I then illustrate how a negative interpretation of net
neutrality is able to successfully address some of these forms of
private discrimination. Thereafter, the second section begins by
*
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tracing the forms of private discrimination, which negative net
neutrality is unable to address by delineating the different kinds
of (lack of) internet access. It then maps these factors hindering
internet access against two important aspects of freedom of
speech and expression, viz. the principle of media diversity and
the goal of expanding citizens’ access to media infrastructure,
some aspects of which can be termed structural media access.
In the third section of this paper, I argue that the delinking of
the principles of media diversity and structural media access in
law and policy debates hinders an inclusive response to all forms
of private discrimination. Thereafter, through an examination of
TRAI’s policy engagement with these issues, I argue that these
principles need to be relinked for the development of a concept of
net neutrality which comprehensively addresses the concerns of
freedom of speech and expression for citizens in the global south.

I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of zero-rated internet services has initiated concern regarding net neutrality debate in the developing world. Usually offered in the
form of mobile internet apps, zero-rated internet refers to digital services
which offer content to users free of mobile data costs. Facebook’s Internet.
org (later, rebranded as “Free Basics”1), which has been offered in certain
developing countries2 including in India3, has been one of the most discussed
examples of such services. According to Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg,
Internet.org will contribute to diminishing the digital divide by allowing
people to access the internet at lower cost.4
1

2

3

4

Srinivasan Ramani, Facebook rebrands internet.org platform as “Free Basics by
Facebook,”The Hindu, 25 September 2015, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/internet/facebook-rebrands-internetorg-platform-as-free-basics-by-facebook/article7686680.ece>, last accessed 03 January 2017.
Internet.org by Facebook, Where We Have Launched, Facebook, available at <https://
info.internet.org/en/story/where-weve-launched/>, last accessed 03 January 2017.
Facebook, Internet.org App Now Available In India, 10 February 2015, available at
<http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/02/internet-org-app-now-available-in-india/>, last
accessed 03 January 2017. This was also followed by zero-rating app offer by Airtel in
India, see Firstpost on 21 April 2015, available at <http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/timeline-airtel-zero-to-internet-org-what-fuelled-the-ongoing-net-neutrality-debatein-india-264130.html>, last accessed 03 January 2017.
Jonathan Barnes, Inside Facebook’s Ambitious Goal To Bridge The Digital Divide With
Drones, 31 March 2014, available at<http://www.forbes.com/sites/ptc/2014/03/31/insidefacebooks-ambitious-goal-to-bridge-the-digital-divide-with-drones/#7e6cb161e430>, last
accessed 03 January 2017.
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But contrary to its misleading name, Internet.org does not provide free
access to the entire internet. In fact, it cherry picks internet content services
which Facebook deems useful for the financially-lacking users of Internet.
org. Content on Internet.org has been limited, among others, to certain
websites providing information about weather, news, dictionaries, medical
assistance, sports updates, and of course, Facebook. Consequently, Internet.
org has been accused of attempting to create a “poor person’s internet,”5 by
leaving out large portions of the internet out of its offer of Internet.org as
well as of distorting market competition against local internet content platforms and individual content creators like bloggers which are not part of the
Internet.org scheme.6 Another point of criticism has been that since Internet.
org can be accessed only through a “qualifying” mobile operator7, it also
distorts competition in the telecommunications market.8 And since it does
not treat all internet traffic equally, but rather works by prioritising certain
content over others, it is argued to be in violation of net neutrality, which
may be broadly understood as a principle of non-discrimination between
different kinds and sources of internet content by private owners of internet
media infrastructure.9
In this manner, like other zero-rated services, Internet.org has been characterised both as a supposed exterminator of the digital divide and as a
violator of net neutrality. But what do these characterisations mean for the
5

6

7

8

9

Cory Doctorow, ‘Poor Internet for Poor People’: India’s Activists Fight Facebook
Connection Plan, 15 January 2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/jan/15/india-net-neutrality-activists-facebook-free-basics>, last accessed 03
January 2017.
It should be noted that Facebook claims that any content provider can join Internet.org,
but it still means that Facebook is exercising a gatekeeping function upon the users of
Internet.org by choosing which content application is made available, rather than making
all internet content available. See infra note 18 for elaboration on this criticism.
The description for Facebook Free Basics on Google Play states, “With Free Basics, you
can connect to Facebook and other websites for free using a SIM card from a qualifying
mobile operator. Stay in touch with friends and family, search for jobs, check out news
and sports updates, and get health information – all without data charges.” (emphasis
added), available at<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.internet&hl=de>,
last accessed 03 January 2017.
Nikhil Pahwa, What Mark Zuckerberg Didn’t Say About Internet.org, 10 October 2014,
available at <http://www.medianama.com/2014/10/223-zuckerberg-india-internet-org/>,
last accessed 03 January 2017; The Economist, Why Facebook’s “free internet” effort is
in trouble in India, 06 January 2016, available at<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/01/economist-explains-3>, last accessed 03 January 2017; Mathew
Ingram, Is Facebook’s Internet.org project a charitable effort or a customer acquisition
strategy?, Fortune Magazine, 20 May 2015, available at <http://fortune.com/2015/05/20/
facebook-internet-org/> , last accessed 03 January 2017.
This generic understanding of net neutrality is based on the work of Tim Wu, who coined
the term. See, Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, available at <http://www.timwu.org/
network_neutrality.html>, last accessed 13 February 2018.
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freedom of expression on the internet? The broad aim of this paper is to
address this question by unravelling the implications of the net neutrality
debate on the freedom of speech and expression on the internet. The contextual focus on zero-rated internet services in this regard is of special relevance
for developing countries like India which have seen a significant rise in such
services.
One might ask why it is important to contextualise the net neutrality
debate against the idea of freedom of expression, especially since the issue of
net neutrality stems from techno-commercial concerns of the private sphere.10
On the other hand, as one of the fundamental rights for democracy, freedom
of expression qualifies soundly as a public issue, and seems to have little
direct relationship with the private technical/economic sphere of net neutrality. However in reality, the debates of net neutrality and those of freedom of
expression online are actually deeply intertwined. A legal governance mechanism embodying net neutrality principles has consequences for the original
architecture of the internet,11 which is widely (if questionably) assumed to
be more decentralised, and therefore have more democratic potential than
the media preceding it.12 It is argued that a legal design embodying net neutrality is essential to prevent a compromise of this architecture.13 Such a
compromise can occur through arbitrary discrimination by the owners of
“private conduits of public expression”14 on the internet,15 which can seriously erode citizens’ right to freedom of speech and expression in the digital sphere.16 These private conduits- the material networks through which
information on the internet flows (viz. cable internet networks, dedicated
10

11
12

13

14

15

16

V. Sridhar and Rohit Prasad, How Complex is Net Neutrality?, OUP BLOG http://blog.
oup.com/2015/05/how-complex-is-net-neutrality/ (last updated May 8, 2015).
Barbara Van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation, 355-375 (2010).
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 Duke L. J. 1783 (2002); See also
generally, Barbara Van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (2010),Jonathan
Zittrain, The Future of the Internet (2008),LAWRENCE LESSIG, Code Version: 2.0
(2006).
Barbara van Schewick, Towards An Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation, 5 Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 338340 (2007); Parminder Jeet Singh, Net Neutrality Is Basically Internet Egalitarianism,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, Issue no. 19 (09 May 2015); supra note 4 ,
96-97, 387-388.
Dawn Nunziato, Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Freedom of Speech in the Internet
Age, 1-23 (2009).
Nikhil Pahwa, Airtel Wants To Ruin The Internet By Bringing In A Digital VIP Culture,
Scroll.in, 7 April 2015, available at<https://scroll.in/article/718820/airtel-wants-to-ruinthe-internet-by-bringing-in-a-digital-vip-culture> (last accessed 3 January 2017); Sean
Hollister, Netflix Accuses Comcast of Charging Twice for the Same Internet Content,
The Verge, April 24, 2014, available at<http://www.theverge.com/2014/4/24/5650406/
netflix-accuses-comcast-of-double-dipping-with-isp-toll> (last accessed 3 January 2017).
Dawn Nunziato Supra note 14, 2-23.
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leased lines, optic fibre networks, mobile spectrum networks or satellite
internet)- constitute the infrastructure for the internet media.17 It is the huge
gatekeeping power which private actors exercise over this internet media
infrastructure18 that has led to concerns about the limitation of freedom of
speech and expression on the internet, and its subsequent adverse impact for
democracy.19
All this hints that the boundaries between the public right to free expression and the private sphere of commercial negotiations and net neutrality are
blurry. 20 One cannot really hope to understand net neutrality, either descriptively or normatively, without delving into what free expression online really
means or should mean, and vice-versa. Engaging with one provides the missing link to comprehensively engaging with the other. This is what the present
paper hopes to do. It asks how far freedom of expression on the internet is
protected through our understandings of net neutrality. What implications
do such understandings of net neutrality have for media diversity and digital
divide? Relatedly, how can we reimagine net neutrality, especially in the
global south context of India, such that it really protects and enhances the
democratically-cherished idea of freedom of expression?
To approach these questions, I refrain from laying down the definitions
of either “net neutrality” or “freedom of expression”at the beginning, since
both are terms with evolving meanings that also vary according to the philosophical lens used to understand them. 21 The paper rather approaches these
terms by mapping their diverse socio-legal understandings in the context
of citizens’ interests to lay down a theoretical framework for a freedom of
expression-oriented conception of net neutrality. 22 The hope is that such
17

18

19

20
21

22

Throughout this paper, I use the terms “media/internet infrastructure” and “infrastructure for media/internet” interchangeably to mean the material or physical infrastructure
which makes media/internet possible.
Parminder Jeet Singh, Net Neutrality Is Basically Internet Egalitarianism, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue no. 19(09 May 2015); Pranesh Prakash, Regulatory
Perspectives on Net Neutrality, The Centre for Internet and Society, 08 July 2015, available at<http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality> (last accessed 03 January 2017).
Anita Gurumurthy, Net Neutrality at a Crossroads: Why India’s Policy Process has
Important Lessons for the US, OpenDemocracy, 30 November 2017, available at <https://
www.opendemocracy.net/anita-gurumurthy/net-neutrality-crossroads-heres-why-india-s-policy-process-has-important-lessons-fo> (last accessed 13 February 2018).
Christopher T. Marsden, Net Neutrality: Towards A Co-Regulatory Solution, 1-2 (2010).
See, Gautam Bhatia, Offend, Shock, or Disturb3-24(2016), for a discussion on how the
legal understanding of freedom of speech and expression depends on the legal theory used
to conceptualise it.
In using this methodological approach, I draw on the work of STS scholars like Shoshana
Zuboff who understands technical concepts (in her case, big data) as a social process rather
than an autonomous technological effect. See, Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance
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mapping will allow a deeper and more nuanced understanding of these concepts and consequently, more responsive governance centred on the citizen.
To do this, the paper is divided into three major sections: I begin by analysing how far different conceptions of freedom of speech and expression
respond to private forms of clamping of speech. To do this, I invoke Jack
Balkin’s theory of democratic culture and contextualise it against the jurisprudence on freedom of expression in contexts of private discrimination
in India. I then illustrate how a negative interpretation of net neutrality is
able to successfully address some of these forms of private discrimination.
Thereafter, the second section begins by tracing the forms of private discrimination, which negative net neutrality is unable to address by delineating the different kinds of (lack of) internet access. It then maps these
factors hindering internet access against two important aspects of freedom
of speech and expression, viz. the principle of media diversity and the goal
of expanding citizens’ access to media infrastructure, some aspects of which
can be termed structural media access. In the third section of this paper, I
argue that the delinking of the principles of media diversity and structural
media access in law and policy debates hinders an inclusive response to all
forms of private discrimination. Thereafter, I argue that such delinking hinders the development of a concept of net neutrality which comprehensively
addresses the concerns of freedom of speech and expression for citizens in
the global south by examining TRAI’s policy engagement with these issues.
A couple of points regarding the scope of the present paper need to be
underscored in order to pre-empt the misconstruction of its arguments. First,
this paper responds to the net neutrality debate in the context of zero-rating practices via the limited framework of freedom of expression. It does
not, in any comprehensive way, take into account alternative frameworks
like competition and innovation, to name a couple, through which zerorated internet applications can and need also be analysed for any efficient
law- and policy-making to occur. Consequently, the present paper refrains
from providing any comprehensive legal policy or governance solutions to
the phenomenon of zero-rating in developing countries- it deals with only
one aspect of it, viz. the freedom of speech and expression.
The second point is that the present paper limits itself to analysing only
mobile-based zero-rating. This is because, first, since the economic, access
and experiential ecologies of broadband and mobile data/internet are quite
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilisation, J. of Info Tech., 30 75-89
(2015). Like her, I propose understanding net neutrality as a social process, shaped also
through legal influence, rather than as something rooted in the inherent architecture of the
internet.
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different, it is possible that arguments applying within one context would
not be valid within another. Second, the ratio of mobile connections (5.6
billion) to fixed line internet connections (572 million) in developing countries is 10:1, which is a significant difference from the developed world ratio
of 3:1. 23 This potentially makes mobile-based zero-rating way more relevant
for developing countries like India. And third, because mobile internet is
emerging as an increasingly popular as a mode of internet access – at the
end of December 2015, India had over 331 million internet subscribers in the
country, of which about 94% were wireless internet users24 - it is appropriate
that mobile-based zero-rating become the focus of this analysis.

II. NET NEUTRALITY AS A RESPONSE
TO PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION OF FREE
EXPRESSION
A. Forms of private control of speech and expression
Traditionally, the State has been understood as the most powerful presence
in the public sphere, and therefore, usually it is against the State that the freedom of expression has been invoked by law. 25 However, in the past century,
there has been an increasing recognition of the vast influence that private
entities wield on communication within public spheres around the world. 26
This has been characterised by two distinct threads: First, cases of private
instances of censorship that occur when creators and distributors of expression lose faith in the State enforcement of the rule of law.27 These cases raise
23

24

25

26

27

International Telecommunications Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators
Database, ITU: Geneva 19th edition (1 July 2015), available at <http://www.itu.int/en/
ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/wtid.aspx>,(last accessed on 03 January 2017).
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, The Indian Telecom Services Performance
Indicators, September-December 2015; see also, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India,
Pre-Consultation Paper on Net Neutrality, 30 May 2016, 1
See for example, Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881; S. Rangarajan
v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 : (1989) 2 SCR 204, Bobby Art International v. Om
Pal Singh Hoon, (1996) 4 SCC 1; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : AIR
2015 SC 1523.
Dawn Nunziato Supra note 14; see also Laura Stein, Speech Rights in America: The First
Amendment, Democracy and the Media (2006); Gautam Bhatia Supra note 21, 257-280
An example of this phenomenon is the private agreement made by Penguin India with
certain religious fundamentalist groups to pulp all copies of The Hindus: An Alternative
History, a book by American Indologist, Wendy Doniger, and in the decision of renowned
Tamil writer, Perumal Murugan, to stop writing in face of threats of violence from other
private citizens. See, Jason Burke, Outcry as Penguin India pulps ‘alternative’ history of
Hindus, 13 February 2014, available at <https://www.theguardianotecom/world/2014/
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the larger concern of the breakdown of the rule of law and require a broader
discussion on State and constitutional legitimacy, which is beyond the scope
of the present paper. However, I outline this thread because it is important to
distinguish it from a second thread of private censorship cases which relate
to the rise of powerful media firms that control the content and distribution
channels for the citizen. 28
This second thread concerns the ability of private entities, in their role
as market participants, to censor and distort speech and expression within
the public sphere, based on commercial considerations like competition and
advertising revenue. In India, this private influence on the public sphere was
recognised as problematic by the First Press Commission Report 29 way back
in 1954, which noted that the market dominance of certain privately owned
newspapers could be detrimental to the freedom of expression of other citizens.30 Since then, there have been several judicial and policy discussions
in the context of different media to address this issue of private power over
public speech.31 The exercise of this power has implications for freedom of
expression in two ways:
(i) Direct discrimination: This refers the use of power to distort the free
expression of certain citizens over others by preventing them from
expressing themselves or communicating to other individuals or the
public at large. Typical examples of such discrimination include censorship of certain speech or expression by the private entity, usually
for directly or indirectly fulfilling commercial ends. It has a direct
discriminatory impact through the restriction of expression by certain citizens or entities over others.
(ii) Indirect discrimination: As the nomenclature suggests, indirect
discrimination refers to a more indirect interference in freedom of
expression of certain citizens over others. An example of this might be

28

29
30
31

feb/13/indian-conservatives-penguin-hindus-book>, last accessed 03 January 2017. See
also, Gautam Bhatia, The Fault in Our Speech, 07 July 2016, available at <http://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/lead/perumal-murugan-book-controversy-and-madras-high-court/
article8816396.ece>, (last accessed 03 January 2017)
Robert W. McChesney and Dan Schiller, The Political Economy of International
Communications, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (October
2003), available at <http://www.unrisd.org/UNRISD/website/document.nsf/d2a23ad2d50cb2a280256eb300385855/c9dcba6c7db78c2ac1256bdf0049a774/$FILE/mcchesne.
pdf>, (last accessed 7 January 2017).
Government of India, First Press Commission Report (1954).
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305.
See for example, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1973
SC 106; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC
641 : AIR 1986 SC 515; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India v.
Cricket Assn. of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 : AIR 1995 SC 1236.
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the promotion (and consequent indirect hindrance) to the circulation
of certain speech or expression by the concerned private entity, usually for directly or indirectly fulfilling commercial ends. In the digital
context, this can mean the promotion of certain kinds of content over
others by making them more visible in search results or on social
media32 or the preferential treatment of content from certain sources
over others.33 But it can also include practices of network traffic management.34 Unlike direct discrimination, it is less clear whether indirect discrimination is harmful or advantageous to citizens.35
Private power can thus interfere in freedom of expression by perpetuating
discrimination. This issue of the power of private entities to control public
speech has come into even starker focus since early 2000s with the widespread use of digital media.36 One key feature of the internet is its highly
decentralised architecture rooted in the end-to-end principle.37 While this
architecture is argued to have huge democratic potential, 38 it also implies
that private network owners like Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have the
power to control how and what information flows on the networks they
own. In other words, network owners can block certain digital expression
(negative discrimination), or offer certain content only for a higher or lower
price in relation to other content (positive discrimination). This power can
and has been exercised by private network owners in the past for commercial ends.39

32

33

34

35
36

37
38

39

See for example, Emily Bell, Why Facebook’s news feed changes are bad news for democracy, The Guardian, 21 January 2018, available at https://www.theguardianotecom/
media/media-blog/2018/jan/21/why-facebook-news-feed-changes-bad-news-democracy,
(last accessed 14 February 2018).
See for example, Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Netflix Agrees to Pay Comcast for Access
to Its Broadband Network, Gizmodo, 23 February 2014, available at <https://gizmodo.
com/report-netflix-agrees-to-pay-comcast-for-access-to-bro-1529115565>, (last accessed
14 February 2018).
Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Net Neutrality 6-7 (2006), available at <https://
www.cs.princetonoteedu/courses/archive/fall09/cos109/neutrality.pdf>, (last accessed 14
February 2018).
Christopher T. Marsden Supra note 20, 83-104.
See generally, Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet (2008); Lawrence Lessig,
Code Version: 2.0 (2006).
Supra note 20, 29.
See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech And Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression For The Information Society, 79 NOTEY.U. L. Rev. 6-9 (2004), arguing
that the original internet architecture has a unique democratic potential. This is however a contested argument. See Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalisation of
Internet Governance (2009), and Alexander Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists
after Decentralisation (2004), for arguments on how the original internet architecture is
complicit in perpetuating undemocratic power over the internet.
Supra note 15.
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B. The Capitalist Theory of Free Speech and its
Obliviousness to Private Discrimination
It may be argued that the exercise of power by private network owners for
directly or indirect discriminating speech and expression flowing on their
networks is perfectly permissible because these networks constitute their
private property. Accordingly, it is the imposition of a net neutrality regulation on such private network owners that will, in fact, lead to a violation
of the freedom of expression. Such arguments are based on what American
legal scholar, Jack Balkin has termed the “capitalist theory of free speech.”
According to Balkin, the capitalist theory identifies freedom of speech with
the ownership of distribution networks for digital content.40 In other words,
freedom of expression under this theory is thought to be protected when the
owners of speech distribution networks are not subject to any restrictions.
Balkin notes that among other areas, the capitalist theory has been influential in the judicial interpretation of digital telecommunications law in the
United States.41 Consequently, telecommunications companies including
ISPs and cable broadband providers have successfully argued in American
courts that State regulation which curbs their power to discriminate what or
how content flows on their networks stands in violation of their freedom of
expression as speakers and editors.42 This judicial trend has also been attributed to a “negative conception”43 of the First Amendment to the American
Constitution.44 A negative conception refers to the interpretation of freedom
of speech and expression as a negative liberty, whereby the only obligation
of the State is to not unlawfully interfere in arenas where public speech,
expression and exchange of ideas occur. Such conception finds its beginnings in legal formalism.45 Consequently, the First Amendment has often
been interpreted as an obligation by the State to not regulate media firms on
grounds that are outside of the considerations of upholding a free market.46
In the process, the property rights of the media firms are reinforced to the
40

41

42
43
44

45
46

Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech And Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression For The Information Society, 79 NOTEY.U. L. Rev. 19 (2004).
See, for example, Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 240 F 3d 1126, 1136, 1139 (DC Cir 2001); Comcast Cablevision Inc. v.
Broward County, 124 F Supp 2d 685, 694 (SD Fla 2000); US West Inc. v. United States, 48
F 3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States,
42 F 3d 181, 202 (4th Cir 1994).
Ibid.
Dawn Nunziato Supra note 14, 24.
The relevant portion of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: “Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
Dawn Nunziato Supra note 14, 36.
Laura Stein, Speech Rights in America: The First Amendment, Democracy and the Media
33-36 (2006).
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exclusion of everyone else in all circumstances, as such an interpretation
allows the media firm to do what it pleases over the networks it owns. The
capitalist theory of free speech thus remains the overarching philosophy of
this negative conception of freedom of expression.
However, the manifestation of the capitalist theory of free speech is
hardly limited to American jurisprudence. In India as well, some of the most
crucial judgments on freedom of speech and expression seem rooted in the
capitalist theory. The Supreme Court judgment in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India 47 is one example. Sakal concerned a State regulation that
prescribed a minimum price below which big newspapers could not be sold.
Such fixing of minimum price was done so that small newspapers, which
could not easily attract advertising revenue, would not be driven out of business by big newspapers like Sakal, which could. The rationale of the regulation, therefore, was to “prevent unfair competition amongst newspapers”48
and “to prevent the rise of monopolistic combines so that newspapers may
have fair opportunities of freer discussion.”49 One of the questions before
the Court consequently was whether the regulation stood in violation of
the big newspapers’ Constitutional freedom of speech and expression? This
question arose since such fixing of minimum price would make them more
expensive and therefore likely to curtail the volume of their circulation. The
Supreme Court employed a formalistic mode of interpretation to conclude
that the newspapers’ right to circulate as much volume as they wanted was
an essential part of the freedom of speech and expression.50 On that basis, it
held that the intervention of the impugned State regulation, even though it
was in the interest of creating fair opportunities for freer discussion, was not
constitutionally permissible since it would encroach upon these newspapers’
private networks of circulation.51
Under this judicial rationale, irrespective of the objective of State intervention, it is only a State policy which maintains a hands-off outlook to
newspapers’ circulation networks that will survive Sakal’s constitutional
test of free speech.52 Consequently, this rationale also serves to strengthen
47
48
49
50
51
52

Sakal Papers Case Supra note 30.
Sakal Papers Case Supra note 30, ¶11.
Ibid.
Sakal Papers Case Supra note 30, ¶31.
Sakal Papers Case Supra note 30, ¶42.
For an in-depth analysis of Sakal, see, Gautam Bhatia, Sakal Papers v. Union of
India – I: Why Do We Have The Freedom of Speech?, 02 August 2013, available at
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the idea of property rights which private newspapers claim in their circulation networks, to the exclusion of everyone else, including the State. In
this way, the rationale of the Sakal also reflects the capitalist theory of the
freedom of speech.
The question to ask for our analysis is whether the philosophical groundings of the capitalist theory are adequate for the protection of freedom of
expression on the internet? The answer seems obvious. Since the capitalist
theory roots the idea of free speech in ownership of the channels of communication, it would hardly view any kind of discrimination by private entities
who own these channels as a violation of free speech. If the principle of net
neutrality is understood to impose legal obligation of non-discrimination of
expression that flows even on the private owner of broadband networks or
other internet infrastructure53, and therefore constitutes interference by the
State in privately-owned media networks, it would constitute a free speech
violation within the philosophical framework of the capitalist theory.

C. Addressing Private Forms of Discrimination through
Democratic Culture of Expression
What we have seen so far is that capitalist theory’s hypersensitivity to the
power of the State to disrupt communication in private spaces makes it
totally oblivious to the ways in which private economic power operating
through markets can corrupt democratic processes. 54 This obliviousness
also manifests itself in Indian jurisprudence in judgments like Sakal, which
though traditionally hailed as landmark for the protection of freedom of
expression55, has been criticised by more recent scholarship for this reason.56
It is to combat this obliviousness, particularly in the digital context, 57 that
Jack Balkin evolves his theory of democratic culture.58 The emphasis of this
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theory lies on understanding free speech as a principle larger than democracy in the narrow sense of voting and elections as well as larger even than
democracy in the sense of public deliberation about issues of public concern.
The theory posits the concept of free speech not merely at the level of governance or governance, but at the level of culture. 59 This broad conception
of free speech allows one to move beyond the exercise of the freedom only in
the public sphere, viz., against the State like the capitalist theory focuses on.
By connecting free speech to a democratic culture, the theory of democratic
culture thus gives us a philosophical framework to recognize, conceptualise
and limit private economic power over freedom of expression.
In jurisprudential analysis, the theory of democratic culture manifests
itself in the development of an affirmative conception of freedom of speech,
which instead of legal formalism, is rooted in balance of interests approach.60
According to this approach, State intervention in private media infrastructure is best understood by perceiving the former as a tool through which the
interests of those who are seeking to regulate versus the interests of those
whose expression is to be regulated, are sought to be balanced.61 Based on
this, it has been argued that the doctrines of public forum, state action,
fairness, common carriage, and must-carry obligations in American jurisprudence all contribute to solidifying the affirmative conception of freedom
of speech, and consequently, the arguments for upholding net neutrality in
law and policy making.62
Indian jurisprudence has also borrowed some of these, like the state action
doctrine63 and fairness doctrine from American jurisprudence64, and some
others, like the common carriage principle from English jurisprudence.65
The affirmative conception of freedom of speech is also found in Indian
jurisprudence,66 notably in Justice Mathew’s dissent in Bennett Coleman &
59
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Co. v. Union of India, and in the Supreme Court judgment in Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal.67
Drawing upon the democratic culture theory, arguments have also been
made in literature that legal recognition of the net neutrality principle in
India would preserve the affirmative conception of the freedom of speech,
which would be in consonance with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.68
Since net neutrality is a principle of non-discrimination69, it allows for State
intervention in privately-owned internet infrastructure to prevent private
forms of discrimination.70 This is necessary to enable and strengthen individual participation in all cultural exchanges that occur on the internet,
which as per the theory of democratic culture, is essential to the idea of freedom of speech and expression. Thus in contrast to the capitalist theory, the
principle of net neutrality becomes not just compatible with the protection
of freedom of expression, but also essential to protect it.71

D. Democratic Culture and Direct Discrimination: The
Formulation of Negative Net Neutrality
Across the world, many legal and policy interventions addressing private
discrimination of speech and expression on internet through deployment
of the net neutrality principle have already been made. The first of such net
neutrality law in the world was Act 20453, Ley queestablece la neutralidad
de la red para consumidores y usarios de Internet, which was passed by
the Chilean national legislature in 2010. The law lays down that internet
service providers “cannot arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, obstruct
or restrict user’s right to use, send, receive or offer” internet content.72 This
was followed by the enactment of Marco Civil da Internet73 by the Brazilian
Senate in 2014, which among other things, lays down, “when providing
internet connectivity, free or at a cost, as well as, in the transmission,
switching or routing, it is prohibited to block, monitor, filter or analyze the
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content of data packets.”74 Other South American countries like Colombia
and Peru have also been active in developing net neutrality legislations.75
Though there are differences,76 one will note that the emphasis in these
earliest net neutrality laws is upon prevention of a particular kind of private
discrimination, viz., direct discrimination. Such interpretation of net neutrality has been termed as “negative net neutrality” in legal literature.77
In February 2015, this concept of negative net neutrality was translated
by the U.S. Telecommunications Regulator, FCC, into two basic principles
as part of the “bright-line rules”78 in its Open Internet Order79: First, the
principle of no blocking, which lays down that broadband providers may not
block access to legal content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices.80 Second, the principle of no throttling, which lays down that broadband
providers may not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices.81 In November 2015,
the European Union also adopted the Regulation on Open Internet Access82
which incorporates the principles of no blocking and no throttling in the EU
Digital Single Market83, thus broadly enshrining the concept of negative net
neutrality.
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In India, the telecommunications regulator TRAI also issued
Recommendations on Net Neutrality in November 2017 after extensive
public consultations.84 The Recommendations prohibit “any form of discrimination, restriction or interference in the treatment of content including practices like blocking, degrading, slowing down,”85 thus embodying
the principle of negative net neutrality.

E. Unpacking Zero Rating: Democratic Culture and
Indirect Discrimination
However while essential, is this principle of negative net neutrality enough
to protect freedom of expression online? To answer this, one needs to return
to the philosophical framework of democratic culture to analyse what it
really means to have free expression.
According to the theory of democratic culture, individual participation is
an essential part of freedom of expression,86 which implies having access to
the media technologies (in this case, the internet) which make such participation possible. To this end, Balkin argues that freedom of expression means
“giving everyone – not just a small number of people who own dominant
modes of mass communication, but ordinary people, too – the chance to use
technology to participate.”87 In this manner, the democratic culture theory
recognises the right of all citizens to have an opportunity to access the internet as an essential part of the freedom of speech and expression.
Zero-rated services claim to provide and enhance exactly this opportunity
for internet access by providing internet content free of data cost, and thus
eliminating the digital divide. Read in conjunction with the democratic culture theory, this claim can thereby also be understood as a claim to enhance
freedom of expression on the internet.
However, the problem is that this claim is only made possible through
private discriminatory practices whereby certain content is eliminated from
the scope of the zero-rated service, and certain other content favoured,
viz. through indirect discrimination. However, such indirect discrimination is argued to enhance the experience of the internet usage by improving
some accessibility. The improvement of Quality of Service (QoS) has been
one of the most prominent examples of such indirect discrimination. QoS
84
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improvement has been a prominent objective of internet engineering for a
long time now,88 and became especially relevant for internet users with the
advent of the so-called “specialised services” like internet video, P2P, and
online gaming, which consume large bandwidths and require reliable flow
of data packet traffic89 - in other words, better QoS. Often, the deployment
of better QoS for specialised services has meant some erosion of absolute
non-discrimination principles which negative net neutrality may prescribe.90
Mirroring this phenomenon, the business model of mobile internet zero-rating allows the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) to discriminate between
different internet content services to provide some for a reduced price or for
‘free.’91 Thus, like specialised internet services, zero-rating is also a phenomenon that imbibes private indirect discrimination92 , which can undermine
online freedom of expression.
Private indirect discrimination thus seems to both enhance and undermine citizens’ accessibility to the internet. It is in this background that the
concept of ‘positive net neutrality’ has been formulated, which allows for
certain discriminatory practices like offering higher QoS for higher prices
as long as it is conducted on fair, reasonable, and equal terms to all.93 The
EU Regulation on Open Internet Access embodies the positive net neutrality
principle by allowing for“reasonable traffic management”94 and the offer of
specialised services that are optimised to “meet requirements of the content,
applications or services for a specific level of quality,”as long as it they are
not offered in “detriment of the availability or general quality of internet
access services for end-users.”95 On the other hand, positive net neutrality
is not recognised under the FCC’s bright line rules of 2015 which make
a blanket prohibition on paid prioritisation of internet traffic by the ISP
under their third principle.96 In its Recommendations on Net Neutrality,
TRAI leans towards the EU model in recognizing a principle of positive net
88
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neutrality by also allowing exceptions for “reasonable traffic management
practices”97 and for specialized services as long as they are “not detrimental
to the availability and overall quality of internet access service.”98
However, positive net neutrality in these instances has been specific to
the addressing the advantages and disadvantages of indirect discrimination
in the cases of traffic management, paid prioritization of content and specialized services.99 What concept of net neutrality is needed to govern the
consequences of indirect discrimination created by zero-rated practices?
To address indirect discrimination created by zero-rating, TRAI issued a
Regulation in February 2016 that prohibits the differential pricing of data
services on the basis of source and content.100 As a corollary, it also prohibits zero-rating practices. But what should one then make of the claim that
zero-rating also improves internet accessibility? How can one make sense
of this paradox where zero rating seems to both enhance opportunities to
connect to (a portion of) the internet as well as perpetuate indirect private
control over the citizens’ expression online? What conception of net neutrality can create an effective legal response for this scenario? To answer this
question, one needs to first clarify what exactly is meant by internet accessibility in this context and how it relates to indirect private discrimination.
Subsequently, what precise aspects of freedom of expression are impacted by
such lack of access to the internet? To address this, I map the relationship
between these understandings of internet access as indirect discrimination
in law and policy debates concerning net neutrality and zero rating in India
in the next section.

III. ZERO RATING: MAPPING DEBATES AROUND
MEDIA ACCESS
A. Meanings of Internet (In)Access
In public policy debates concerning net neutrality and zero-rating, the precise
scope of the barriers to internet access, and therefore the meaning of internet access itself, has not always been clear. Because of this, net neutrality
97
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discussions tend to mix up different understandings of access to the internet, often offering solutions from merely a competition law framework,101 or
from only a negative net neutrality perspective, when the problems concerning freedom of expression in its context are much wider. Consequently in
the present section, I start by delineating the different kinds of internet (in)
access which are faced by citizens that a comprehensive idea of freedom of
expression must distinguish in the context of net neutrality.
The precise way in which the lack of internet access is experienced by the
citizen relates to the manner in which private indirect discrimination over
her speech or expression may be exercised. Many of these factors which
result in the lack of internet access contribute to the digital divide. These
factors and their relationship to private indirect discrimination of speech
and expression are discussed below:

i. Access limited by price
Often, citizens are unable to access the internet simply because they are not
able to afford the data price at which internet is offered by any MNO. This
creates a situation whereby access to the internet is limited by price. Such
lack of access perpetuates indirect discrimination between those who have
the financial capability to access the internet and those who don’t by preferring the circulation of speech of the former over the latter. Zero-rating, even
as it perpetuates other forms of private discrimination,102 is a business model
which claims to provide solution to such lack of access.103

ii. Access limited by QoS
Access limited by QoS refers to a situation where citizens are not able to
access content on internet because the quality of service is less than desirable.
This results in indirect discrimination between those who have access to better QoS and those who do not, by preferring the circulation of speech online
and receipt of information from the internet by the former over the latter.
101

102

103
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Internet access is often limited by QoS by lost data connections or a congested bandwidth or bad traffic management, and most remarkably affects
internet experiences which consume high bandwidth in the context of specialised services like video streaming, P2P, hi-res images or online gaming.104
Better network management practices can be a solution to this. One such
proposed solution is the paid prioritisation of content, which even as it perpetuates other forms of private discrimination,105 is a business model which
claims to offer a solution to this QoS-limited barrier to internet access.106

iii. Access limited by infrastructure
This refers to a situation whereby the physical (mobile) network infrastructure which is necessary for making internet possible is itself not available in
the geographical area where the citizen resides in. Often, especially in developing countries, the infrastructure is absent due to limited State resources107
or the disinterest of MNOs in extending their services to these areas because
they are not seen as commercially viable ventures. This results in indirect
discrimination by preferring the speech of those who have access to such
infrastructure over those who don’t, for example, by preferring the online
expression of urban residents over rural ones. Project Loon and Facebook
Aquila are some business models, which even as they perpetuate other forms
of private discrimination,108 claim to offer a solution in situations when
access is limited by infrastructure.109
I term the first of these three varieties of lack of access as structural barriers to internet access (more generally, structural barriers to media access)
104
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because they relate to infrastructural problems in the media access ecology.
However as discussed below, there are still more ways in which internet
access may be hindered.

iv. Access limited by cost
When the citizen is unable to make their content or application available to
others on the internet because they encounter significant cost barriers that
go over connecting to the basic internet architecture, then their access is
limited by cost. This kind of lack of internet access perpetuates indirect discrimination by preferring those who can afford to pay for better circulation
of their speech and those who cannot. Such discrimination is most clearly
visible in situations of paid prioritisation where a content provider has to pay
the MNO more than mere internet connection charges to make their content
available on the MNO network.110 Conversely, internet access limited by
cost is also observed in the issue of differential pricing whereby the MNO
charges different rates for different applications, depending on the kind of
application it is.111
It is necessary to distinguish between internet access limited by cost and
that limited by price, since in the case of access limited by cost, it is the
MNO that decides to charge extra for a particular kind of application or
content, which exceeds the data charges incurred by the consumers. But in
the case of access limited by price, the data price itself is unaffordable.

v. Access limited by social and cultural factors
Cultural and social factors like digital literacy,112 familiarity with English,113
and caste barriers,114 to name a few, also play a significant role in curtailing
citizens’ internet access. This results in indirect discrimination by preferring
the speech of those who are not hindered by these socio-cultural factors in
accessing the technology over those who are.
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The factors outlined here are all dominant problems which hinder internet access in India, and are also important factors contributing to the digital
divide across the global south generally.115 Of course, a citizen’s access to
internet might be encumbered in all these ways, or through a combination
of them. But for the purposes of the present paper, I focus on the structural
barriers to internet access, and cost barriers to internet access, and refrain
from dealing in detail with the limitation of internet access by social and
cultural factors since it requires the formulation of certain peculiar cultural
and social contexts which are beyond its scope.
How exactly do these different barriers to access to internet map on to the
vocabulary of freedom of speech and expression online? Specifically, how
are free speech arguments formulated law and policy debates to critique or
advocate for indirect discrimination practices like zero-rating? I address this
question in what follows by examining policy debates on net neutrality and
zero rating in India.

B. Structural Media Access: Arguments for Expanding
Access Limited by Pricing
The TRAI Consultation Paper on Free Data outlines the debate concerning
zero-rating in India, stating that a key argument claimed for zero-rating is
that it will serve as an effective tool to increase internet penetration,116 which
is also found important for the advancement of developmental goals117 and
the reduction of the digital divide.118 In the same vein, the Explanatory
Memorandum to TRAI’s February 2016 Regulation on Differential Pricing
also recognises that zero-rated services, which are a form of differential pricing, “appear to make overall internet access more affordable.”119 Such arguments see the value of zero-rated apps in expanding internet access limited
by price, and therefore improving structural media access generally.
Similar legal arguments have been made in case of other media in Indian
jurisprudence: Sakal, which has been critiqued for its inability to recognise
private discrimination of speech and expression120, was actually also a case
115
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where the Supreme Court recognised the importance of expanding media
access limited by price. As one would recall, in that case, the Government had
argued that the impugned regulation limiting number of newspaper pages
was necessary to prevent indirect discrimination by the big newspapers.
The Court however held that the government regulation stood in violation of freedom of speech and expression, among other things recognising
that the increase in newspaper prices mandated by it would reduce citizens’
access to the newspaper.121 This means that the regulation would limit access
of citizens to the newspapers on the basis of price. This limitation of access
by price has a corresponding effect on the media creators as well. In Sakal,
this happens when the inability of the citizens to purchase the newspapers
due to high prices, viz. (in)access limited by price, leads to a reduction in
the ability of the newspaper owners and editors to circulate their opinions
and views.122 The Court found this aspect of the impugned regulation to be
in violation of Article 19(1)(a) since it hindered “the right to circulate one’s
views to all whom one can reach or care to reach.123
In this manner, the argument in that indirect discrimination of citizens’
will enhance freedom of expression through strengthening structural media
access, has been successfully made in legal debates in India. Can the Sakal
argument then also provide guidance about how to govern indirect discriminatory practices like zero-rating? One needs to examine the entire picture
to answer this.

C. Media Diversity: Arguments for Expanding Access
limited by Cost
Examining the entire picture suggests that while the judgment in Sakal
argues for enhancing structural media access by limiting price barriers to
media access, it was also found on the capitalist theory, which stays oblivious
to private discrimination of free speech and expression.124 This obliviousness
to private discrimination is manifested specifically in its obliteration of arguments concerning cost barriers to media access. The judgment is dismissive
of the Government argument that the market power of the big newspapers
prohibited the smaller newspapers for accessing their audience because they
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could not cover costs for the same.125 This situation actually hurts another
aspect of freedom of speech and expression, viz., media diversity.126
Media diversity finds manifestation as an important part of freedom of
speech and expression in many jurisdictions around the world, though they
all have different approaches to understanding and achieving it.127 In India,
certain aspects of media diversity have been recognised by the Supreme
Court as an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution in context of
television media in the Cricket Assn. case.128
In policy debates concerning net neutrality as well, the concern that
zero-rating practices increase cost barriers to internet access can be found.
The TRAI Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation on Differential
Pricing outlines this argument:
“Several stakeholders have highlighted the potential anti-competitive effects of allowing differential pricing. It is argued that this will
create an uneven playing field among content providers and service
providers or those that have the benefit of large networks will find
themselves in a much stronger bargaining position as compared to
new or smaller businesses. This may create significant entry barriers
and thus harm competition and innovation.”129

Zero-rating can thus potentially create an uneven playing field between
large networks and large content providers which have stronger position in
the market, as compared to start-ups and smaller businesses. This kind of
situation which limits access to the internet by cost between would create an
anti-competitive situation since dominant firms in the market have stronger
bargaining power to negotiate with MNOs on favourable terms to use the
latter’s networks, as compared to smaller content creators, which increases
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the latter’s cost barriers to internet access.130 However, it should be noted
that the use of the word “competition” here acts only as a metaphor, and
does not refer to “competition” as defined under a competition law framework. This is not to say that competition law- related issues do not exist
in the zero-rating context. But when concerns about dominant power of
MNOs and of large content providers are being voiced, it is not competition
law which is being referred to.131
Such arguments that critique zero-rating on the reasoning that it increases
cost barriers to internet access, can be understood to recognise the adverse
impact that it has on media source diversity,132 which is an important part of
the freedom of speech and expression under the democratic culture theory.
In this light, the use of the Sakal reasoning to argue that zero-rating practices, or indirect discrimination generally, enhance freedom of speech and
expression rings false, or at least, fragmentary.
However, this analysis heralds two significant realisations that have
implications for formulating an effective principle of net neutrality: First,
that indirect discriminatory practices like zero-rating do undermine one crucial aspect of freedom of expression, viz. media (source) diversity by increasing cost barriers to media access, even as they strengthen another aspect
of freedom of expression, viz., structural media access by lowering price
barriers to media access. The paradox of private indirect discrimination is
thus produced by pitching these two essential aspects of freedom of speech
and expression against each other.
Second, that the paradox of private indirect discrimination and the nature
of problems raised by zero-rating in the free speech context is not novel or
specific to the internet, but has already been encountered and discussed in
unresolved debates in the context of older media, like newspapers. It points
to a need to consider the larger history of media regulation to address the
regulatory problems around zero-rating practices.
How can these two realisations help us formulate a principle of net neutrality which comprehensively responds to the demands of the freedom of
speech and expression in a world rampant with indirect discriminatory
130
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practices like zero-rating? I attempt to address this question in the next
section.

IV. RETHINKING GOVERNANCE DESIGN
PRINCIPLES FOR FREE EXPRESSION
A. Delinking of Media Diversity and Structural Media
Access as a Problem
The paradox that zero-rating practices undermine media diversity on the
one hand, and strengthen structural media access on the other leads to a
deadlock in formulating regulation for it which responds to freedom of
expression. But why does this paradox exist? I argue that it has its roots in
the delinking of the governance frameworks that deal with media diversity
and with structural media access.
In independent India, this phenomenon of delinking can be traced to legal
debates about newspapers. It has already been discussed how the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Sakal acknowledges structural media access but obliterates media diversity from its discourse on freedom of speech and expression. However, even critiques of Sakal133 illustrate the same folly when they
employ Justice Mathew’s dissent in Bennett Coleman to make a case for
media source diversity. Unlike Sakal, the latter acknowledges media diversity
as an essential part of freedom of expression while acknowledging that private indirect discrimination can increase cost barriers to access.134 However,
it completely overlooks issues of structural media access. Consequently critique and scholarship which build on this dissent also implicitly treat the
issues of structural media access and media diversity as two delinked issues
which are separable from the discourse of freedom of speech and expression.
In policy debates around net neutrality as well, there is a strong tendency
to argue for the separation of issues of media diversity from issues of structural media access.135 The proponents of zero-rating services argue that they
help enhance structural media access through provision of free basic internet
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services,136 while ignoring their implications for media diversity. In a similar way, critics of zero-rating realise the adverse impact it has for media
diversity, acknowledging it as a free speech issue,137 but argue for the separation of this issue from the problem of structural media access. For example, noted net neutrality scholar Barbara van Schewick writes that issues
of offering differential treatment for online expression, which would relate
to media diversity, and issues of (not) charging for the same, which would
relate to structural media access, “are driven by different sets of policy considerations, which should be considered and evaluated separately.”138 On
this assumption, she builds a framework for net neutrality regulation, which
seeks to preserve the media diversity aspect of freedom of speech and expression, while at the same time, separating the issue of structural internet access
therein. This framework has been implicitly endorsed by several civil society
actors in India and also explicitly by the TRAI in framing its regulation on
differential pricing.139 It is also in this vein that TRAI initiated separate consultations140 and recommendations141 on free data, splitting this discourse
from its consultations142 and recommendations143 on net neutrality, thus also
delinking the issue of access limited by price from the issue of erosion of
source diversity.
While a conception of net neutrality which separates the issues of media
diversity and structural media access, might work to foster freedom of
speech and expression in developed countries, the same cannot be said for
the global south. This is simply because the problem of structural internet
(in)access in developed countries is of a different nature than in developing
countries. For instance, insofar as USA faces price barriers to internet access,
it is due to monopolistic combines144, which is not true for India, which has
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a fairly competitive MNO market.145 Structural barriers to internet access in
India, as in other developing countries, primarily stem from a lack of capital
resources: low per capita incomes lead to price barriers to access146, and a
combination of corrupt practices in granting MNO licenses147 and capital
scarcity in the economy leads to access limited by QoS and infrastructure
since in that scenario, neither the State nor the market can invest in NextGeneration Networks or in effectively expanding MNO networks to the
entire populace. These issues of capital scarcity are not as acute in developed
countries, where can afford to separate the issue of structural media (in)
access from media diversity on the internet.
But in the context of the global south, the objective of expanding structural internet access becomes a complicated problem of resource allocation
within the economy. In such a scenario, governance mechanisms must define
whether the scarce capital resources needed for the expansion of structural
internet access should be allocated by a State mechanism like planning or
by the forces of a free market, or by a mixed mechanism which combines
the two, and if the third, it must define what exactly the parameters of such
a combination are, as well. This problem of resource allocation is also the
broad question which cropped up in the Newspaper Cases,148 as it has been
in the case of zero-rating on mobile internet.
In this way, the delinking of media diversity and structural media access
and the exclusion of either from considerations of freedom of expression
results in an unambitious law and policy discourse for the global south.
Though such a discourse is thankfully cognizant of the spectre of private
discrimination, it is still constructed in the rather simplistic and mutually
exclusive binary of citizen interests versus big media interests: Media diversity is correctly recognised as a citizen interest, but price barriers to media
access – another essential citizen interest – is kept outside of the scope of
the discussion, and vice-versa. This results in a lack of recognition of the
complex intertwined nature of citizens’ interest in freedom of speech and
145
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expression.149 Consequently, proposed frameworks for governance tend to
operate upon only a partial consideration of citizens’ interest in freedom
of speech and expression. This also means that two important principles
of freedom of speech and expression, viz. media diversity and structural
media access, which should ideally go hand-in-hand, instead find themselves
on opposite sides and in conflict with each other in governance debates.
It results in said paradox of private discriminatory practices like zero-rating that hinders design of a comprehensive governance framework for free
expression online.

B. Formulating a Freedom of Expression-Oriented
Concept of Net Neutrality
The inadequacy of net neutrality interpretation in addressing all forms of
private discrimination of online speech and expression can also be attributed
to the delinking of the issues of media diversity and structural media access.
It takes into account what has been described as private direct discrimination and thus embodies the principle of negative net neutrality, but as far as
private indirect discrimination is concerned, it only accounts for the issue
of lack of access limited by cost. Both the issues of lack of structural media
access and limitation of access due to socio-cultural factors are kept out
of the ambit of the net neutrality conception produced in the wake of said
delinking. One can observe this in TRAI’s recommended conception of net
neutrality which excludes from its ambit, specialised services that are QoSoptimised for specific content, protocols or user equipment.150
However, much like negative net neutrality, the conception of positive
net neutrality underlying TRAI’s Recommendations on Net Neutrality is
also unable to respond to all forms of private discrimination of speech and
expression. By separating the issue of zero-rating and free data from this
discussion on net neutrality, TRAI’s positive net neutrality conception is
unable to envisage the lack of structural media access as a problem of indirect discrimination. Consequently, the fact that specialised services create
indirect discrimination by preferring the speech, expression and the ability
to receive information online of those with the capability to pay for higher
QoS (access limited by QoS) or with the capability to pay for internet at all
(access limited by price) – both of which contribute to lack of structural
149
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media access- remains unrecognised. One can argue that TRAI tries to
address issues of structural media access through its recommendations on
free data151, and thus is not entirely insensitive to the issue. But it should be
noted that these recommendations are limited to only short-term internet
access schemes with a focus on the narrow category of first-time internet
users in rural areas152 , rather than the larger category of users whose access
is limited by price, QoS, and infrastructure. As a result, it does not regard
such lack of access as a form of discrimination or locate it within in the
wider context of freedom of expression.
This is in contrast to its delinked yet mirrored context of zero-rating,153
which TRAI legitimately understands as a free speech issue and recognises
as discriminatory.154 Such a position implies that even as it remains unresponsive to indirect discrimination inhered through lack of structural media
access, TRAI’s ‘positive net neutrality’ stays sensitive to indirect discrimination by hindering the opportunity for all citizens to be equally heard without
cost constraints (access limited by cost).
I outline these points not to suggestvia a regulation-heavy approach
that like zero-rated services, specialised services should also be banned as
discriminatory under a freedom of expression-oriented conception of net
neutrality. Nor is my intention to propose the neoliberal path of regulation‘Lite’. Rather, it is to argue that a comprehensively responsive net neutrality-based framework of governance must take a nuanced approach to
determine the modalities of what constitutes discrimination on the basis of
speech and expression. Such nuance can be achieved only by relinking the
issues of media diversity and structural media access and bringing them
together under the discourse of right to freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19(1)(a).
As mapped before, our experience of designing regulatory frameworks
for older media technologies like newspapers warns us that we need to take
a more nuanced approach in developing new governance designs for freedom
of expression on the internet: Considering that structural media access and
media diversity are intimately intertwined issues, one needs to bring discussions concerning media diversity and structural media access together if one
wants to develop a legal mechanism which effectively and comprehensively
protects citizens’ freedom of expression in the digital age. To recognise these
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two aspects as essential parts of freedom of expression is to address all forms
of private indirect discrimination on the basis of speech and expression.
Without addressing all these different forms of indirect discrimination, one
cannot eliminate the paradox of zero-rating whereby the principles of structural media access and media diversity become pitted against each other,
and at least one needs to be ignored or prioritised against the other to yield
a feasible governance framework. A freedom of expression-oriented conception of net neutrality then needs to account for all forms of discrimination
– private and public, direct and indirect, and the various forms of indirect
discrimination – within its own discourse.

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to develop a theoretical framework for illustrating the limitations of current law and policy understandings of net neutrality. I have illustrated how both the concepts of negative net neutrality
and positive net neutrality, even when considered together, fail to effectively
respond to the challenges of freedom of speech and expression in global
south contexts generally and in India particularly. To do this, I have outlined
the different barriers to media and internet access that are faced more acutely
by citizens in the global south, and illustrated how they perpetuate various
forms of private indirect discrimination of speech and expression of citizens.
I have then linked these forms of discrimination to long-standing issues of
media diversity and structural media access using various conceptions of
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
In all this, my main argument has been that the delinking of principles
of media diversity and structural media access in the freedom of expression
discourse has been consistent not just in net neutrality debates concerning
the internet, but also in debates concerning older media like newspapers.
This is a sign that issues like net neutrality are not rooted in the novelty of
internet architecture, but rather in the conceptual poverty of our ideas about
freedom of expression. Consequently, only a conceptual enrichment through
relinking of the principles of structural media access and media diversity
under the umbrella of freedom of expression can lead to the formulation of
a concept of net neutrality that is capable of comprehensively responding to
internet access issues in India. In this light, while the regulatory framework
in India has laudably accomplished a lot to address issues of private discrimination online, it still has a long way to go.

